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# PRACTICE SERIES

## 4 Broadening participation in peace processes

Dilemmas & options for mediators

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Centre for  
Humanitarian  
Dialogue

*Mediation for peace*

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (the HD Centre) is a private diplomacy organisation founded on the principles of humanity, impartiality and independence. Its mission is to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict through dialogue and mediation.

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

# Foreword

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## The Mediation Practice Series' overview

The Mediation Practice Series (MPS) was initiated in 2008 as part of the HD Centre's efforts to support the broader mediation community. The series draws on feedback from mediators, including HD Centre practitioners, who tell us they and their teams often lack adequate insight into other peace processes. In the past few years, the international community has significantly strengthened the support available to mediators and their teams. The HD Centre is committed to contributing to this effort and to the improvement of mediation practice.

Based on the shared view that mediators often confront similar dilemmas, although mediation differs widely across peace processes, the HD Centre is producing a series of decision-making tools that draw upon the comparative experience of mediation processes. Each publication in the series will give readers a concise overview of relevant challenges and options, and help them prepare for the potential demands of mediation processes. Although these publications cannot replace practical experience, it is our hope that they can contribute to a more systematic learning process.

The forthcoming publications in this series will be made freely available on the HD Centre's website and will be disseminated through our network and that of our partners. *Broadening participation* is the fourth publication in this series. It builds on the author's previous work on the topic as well as consultations with HD Centre practitioners.



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## Essential points for practitioners

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- The key question in designing peace processes is to decide who should participate in which phase, role and format in order to reach a quality and sustainable agreement.
  - Eventually, all relevant actors have to be included in the negotiations.
  - The context and the objective of the negotiations determine who should participate.
  - In general, participating actors could be all armed groups, all major political parties, civil society groups and sometimes business actors.
  - There are many different models and formats of participation that can fit many different contexts and needs.
  - Participation models range from inclusive participation at the negotiation table, to observer status, various forms of consultations, problem-solving workshops, inclusive implementation arrangements, public decision-making or mass action.
  - Broader participation, in whatever format, ensures a larger buy-in and thus reduces opposition to the peace deal.
  - Broader participation brings more voices to the negotiations and thus enhances the quality and the sustainability of the agreement.
  - Broader participation can be a key aid for mediators in putting pressure on the parties.
  - The main challenges around participation in peace negotiations are related to selection (who selects whom), agreeing on the right participation models, resistance to inclusion or manipulation of participating groups by the negotiation parties.
  - Importantly, exclusionary peace negotiation can be a valid option in specific phases of a process.
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# Broadening participation in peace processes

## Dilemmas & options for mediators

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### 1 Introduction

When political and societal actors, in addition to the primary conflict parties, are involved in peace negotiations, the resulting peace agreements are often more sustainable. Such insights have been supported by statistical evidence<sup>1</sup> as well as by the UN, in recent Secretary-General Reports and Guidance as well as GA resolutions.<sup>2</sup> Yet, mediators have a valid argument that negotiations can get too complicated when the number of parties increases. Hence, there is a need to improve understanding of how to make use of the advantages of broadening participation in peace negotiations without reducing the effectiveness of reaching a peace deal.

Among mediators, one can find two main perspectives when it comes to broadening participation in peace negotiations. First, UN mediators in particular feel trapped between the requirement to fulfil UN norms of broader participation and delivering a peace agreement. Bringing the two together seems not always compatible. Second, many mediators approach broader participation in a pragmatic way. They ask what kind of design for a particular peace process best suits the objective of reaching a

quality and sustainable peace deal. The question is, ‘Who should participate in which phase, role and form in order to achieve this objective?’ Participation discussed in this perspective becomes an issue to be analysed for every peace process design.

This paper seeks to provide mediators and mediation teams with a better understanding of, and options for, broadening participation in peace negotiations without sacrificing the effectiveness of the mediation process. It offers mediators and their support teams an accessible survey of the ‘state of the art’ of current debates on and practice of broadening participation in peace processes. This includes :

- essential points for mediators
- who should potentially participate
- why broadening participation matters in peace process designs
- opportunities ; value added
- challenges and how to manage them
- practical options, introducing nine participation models
- suggestions for further reading.

## 2 | **Who should participate in a peace process ?**

Deciding which actors should participate in a peace process is highly context-specific, and also linked to the objective of the mediation process. In general, besides the primary conflicting parties, all armed groups as well as other political and social actors relevant in a given context should be considered for joining the peace process. This is true for groups both in favour and against a peace process. Therefore, participating actors could be all armed groups, political parties, civil society groups including faith-based organisations, special interest groups such as trade unions, professional associations, minority or women’s



organisations, human rights, relief, development or peace non-governmental organisations (NGOs), researchers and research institutions, traditional or indigenous groups, or representatives of social and political movements or loose networks of youth as seen in the Arab Spring. In a few cases, business actors may also be included. However, who should participate is ultimately linked to the phase and objective of the process in question.

### 3 | **Peace process design and participation**

While context is a major determinant of any peace process design, there is also general knowledge and shared experiences of process design. One of the key lessons is that who participated in the process determines the outcome. Moreover, those excluded will not necessarily accept an agreement. As a result, almost 50 % of all negotiated settlements fail in the first five years of their implementation.

Eventually, all relevant groups have to participate to reach a quality agreement that has a good chance of becoming sustainable. Statistically, in 2004, one-third of all peace negotiations already showed broader participation arrangements, and this trend has been rising since.

The above-mentioned list of potentially participating actors presents only general possibilities. Even in contexts where who should participate is deemed obvious, when (at what stage of a given process) and how (what format) such relevant actors can or want to participate also need to be clarified. Often, it is not only the choice of the main belligerents or the mediators to decide who should participate. Powerful groups can lobby their way into the process, or block it – as in the anti-peace demonstrations led by Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka during the 2002–2005 peace process.

Considering the conditions under which exclusion is a valid option is also legitimate, particularly during pre-negotiations. Mediation/facilitation initiatives that run parallel to official negotiations do not have to be inclusive as they have a particular purpose and reach. Informal talks with hard-liner constituencies are aimed at these groups and not meant to be all-inclusive. When official negotiations start, the situation changes and a certain form of participation is usually required. The questions remain, however, as to what form this participation should take, and who should be involved (for more details, please see Section 5 below). During implementation, participation is often needed to define post-agreement arrangements or achieve inclusive implementation mechanisms.

## 4 | **Broadening participation: value added**

Broadening participation in mediation and negotiation processes can strengthen both the effectiveness of the mediation process itself, and the quality and sustainability of the agreement.

### **Strengthening the effectiveness of the negotiation process**

#### **Buy-in of important groups**

Participation lessens the risk that groups will resort to violence to gain access to the negotiations or to express their opposition to an agreement from which they feel excluded. Potentially opposing groups may also need to participate in the process to ensure their constituencies do not feel excluded, their views are represented, and they do not oppose concessions made by the parties during the peace negotiations. In Darfur, for example, the mediation deliberately sought the involvement of community leaders from militarised Arab communities in order to ensure their acceptance of the agreement.

**Pressure on the parties**

Civil society and other groups can have a critical watchdog function. They can support the mediator's strategy and exert public pressure on the parties to reach an agreement, from both inside and outside the negotiation setting. The 2003 Liberia negotiations demonstrated how civil society groups with observer status inside the mediation effectively co-operated with groups outside who generated effective public pressure on the parties.

**Public buy-in**

Broader participation can create a pro-agreement atmosphere in the country through larger public buy-in. In the Northern Ireland peace process, professionally organised campaigns contributed massively to the acceptance of the Good Friday agreement which had previously been a consensus among elites only.

**Knowledge and expertise: enriching the negotiation agenda**

Experts from research or civil society within the country, and also international NGOs (INGOs), can provide the mediation with substantive expertise. If they have been involved for a long time, they may also provide important lessons, as they may constitute an institutional memory for the peace process. In many instances, INGOs play a facilitation role by making international and local expertise available to the mediation process.

**The right to participate**

According to the normative arguments, participatory peace negotiations are an important and logical long-term step towards building democracy. Arguably, they may be even a moral obligation, and an international responsibility based on the 'right to participate'.

**Strengthening the quality and sustainability of the agreement****Enhanced legitimacy and representation**

Greater representation through the involvement of more groups contributes to greater legitimacy for the peace process. This is

especially relevant in situations where one or more belligerent parties have only weak representation within society.

### **Greater diversity and a broader negotiation agenda**

More groups bring a greater diversity of views to the table. This is extremely important for many conflicts, as armed conflict can be a response to exclusion and poor management of diversity by the key elite actors. If groups are excluded from negotiations, this may reduce the future sustainability of the agreement. Broadening participation counteracts the interests of political elites and helps to ensure that broader public interests are included in the negotiation agenda.

### **Monitoring the process**

Experienced groups can play a critical monitoring role during the implementation process, both within and outside official monitoring mechanisms. In the Inter-Yemeni dialogue which started in 2013, a group has been tasked with monitoring the entire dialogue process. This group obtained observer status. In the Kenyan 2008 peace deal, a Kenyan research institution was charged to prepare quarterly monitoring reports on the implementation of the agreement.

## **5 Challenges**

The challenges to broadening participation in peace negotiations are manifold, because conflict parties may oppose broader participation in what they see as ‘their’ process. Who decides which of the many, often competing, groups to work with (or not), as well as how to ensure different perspectives complement those of the parties and can be shared freely and efficiently, are other daunting challenges. Another important challenge is deciding when to choose an exclusionist approach and how to assess its consequences.

The question is, ‘Who owns the process?’ It is often not the mediators or the negotiation parties that can decide this. Powerful groups outside the negotiations might start agitation against the process or lobby their way into the negotiations. Moreover, when participation takes place, it is a management challenge. Many decisions taken on how to make use of participation effectively also depend on the mediator’s openness to participation and his/her ability to make strategic use of participation for the process. UN mediators often find this difficult, as the perceived normative pressure for participation risks undermining a pragmatic approach to participation as part of peace process designs. Some of the core challenges are discussed in further detail below.

### **Conflict parties resist broader participation**

Armed conflict is about power. Equally, the decision about who participates in negotiations is driven by power, and conflict parties are unlikely to share power easily with more groups, especially when the latter do not represent the belligerents’ own constituencies or positions. The nine participation models introduced in the next section present a menu of options that mediators can use to make suggestions for how to broaden participation in case the parties do not want more people at the table. Models such as observer status, consultations or public hearings present different options.

### **Diversity and selection of participants**

Deciding which group to work with, especially in cases where there are no strong and representative countrywide groups, is yet another significant challenge for the mediator. The risk that the groups selected are only those that echo the positions of the conflict parties, or are the noisiest, is real. Groups can be selected by the main negotiation parties, by the mediator, or alternatively by a self-selection process with formal procedures or by representative elections. Mediators need to be aware of selection criteria and processes driven by the belligerent parties, as experience suggests that these will not be effective. One way

to manage this is to let the negotiation parties and the mediation teams nominate an equal number of representatives.

### **Exclusion**

Considering the conditions under which exclusion is a valid option is also a legitimate question, particularly during pre-negotiations. Mediation/facilitation initiatives that run parallel to official negotiations do not have to be inclusive as they have a particular purpose and reach. Informal talks with hard-liner constituencies are aimed at these groups and not meant to espouse inclusive principles. When official negotiations start, the situation changes and a certain form of participation is usually required. The questions remain, however, as to what form this participation should take and who should be involved in it.

### **Manipulation and co-option**

Once more groups have become part of peace negotiations, conflict parties could try to manipulate, persuade or even coerce their representatives to limit the extent to which the process is inclusive. This is not an easy challenge to manage, and requires close co-operation between the mediation team and the groups involved.

### **Insufficient negotiation expertise within participating groups**

Where armed groups, civil society and political parties are weak, it might be necessary to bring in diaspora groups, build capacity of the groups, work with an international reference group of researchers and experts, and use INGOs as facilitators between local groups and the mediation.

### **Mediator's resistance to participation**

Often, mediators have a bias towards exclusive arrangements as they think these are easier to handle. There is also a 'normative trap', especially when it comes to UN mediators: they often feel that normative pressure for inclusion is not realistic, as inclusion complicates the process. As the models of participation below

(Section 6) demonstrate, there are many formats for handling inclusive arrangements in a manageable way.

### **The mediator's capacity to manage participation**

To manage participation, the right expertise needs to be available within the mediation team, or provided to the team by external experts. This expertise includes the capacity to: analyse the best option/approach for engagement (i.e. participation models) as part of the process design; identify the right actors within society; manage diversity and numbers; and establish effective co-ordination procedures. One way to deal with this challenge is to rely on mediation support that provides both generic lessons from other mediation processes and context-relevant proposals.

## **6 | How to broaden participation in practice: nine models of participation**

While in some cases all relevant groups can have a seat at the negotiation table,<sup>3</sup> this might not be possible for all negotiations. Hence, the following nine participation options can suit different contexts. They can take place either in parallel or sequentially, as they are not mutually exclusive.

- 1) Direct representation at the negotiation table like National Dialogues (e.g. Yemen, DRC, Benin)
- 2) Observer status, direct presence during the negotiations (e.g. Liberia, Burundi)
- 3) Official consultative forums (e.g. Guatemala, Afghanistan)
- 4) Consultations, less formal consultations without official endorsement (e.g. Kenya) before, parallel to or after official negotiations
- 5) Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms, participation of societal and political actors in implementation institutions and mechanisms (e.g. Liberia, Mindanao, Kenya)
- 6) High-level civil-society initiatives (or non-official 'Track 1.5' facilitation initiatives, e.g. Georgian-Abkhaz Schlaining Process)

- 7) Public participation, involving the broader population via public hearings, opinion polls, town hall meetings or signature campaigns (e.g. Northern Ireland, Colombia)
- 8) Public decision-making, referenda and other elective forms (e.g. Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Kenya)
- 9) Mass action, street demonstrations, rallies, etc. (e.g. Sri Lanka, Nepal).

### **Model One: Direct representation at the negotiation table**

In this model, all relevant groups are party to negotiations. This is the most direct form of participation and gives all players the same status as the main conflict parties. Examples are the Inter-Yemeni Dialogue that started in 2013 or the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from 2002. In Yemen, the UN mediator pushed for an all-inclusive dialogue as a means to allow all parties jointly to shape the future of their country in the process of the double transition from war to peace and from authoritarian to more democratic forms of governance. This process also ensures broader public buy-in and an acceptance of the agreement by all constituencies.

In general, the greater number of groups makes it more complex and challenging to reach an agreement that satisfies all parties. To address that issue, mediators can resort, for example, to sub-working-groups to break up big numbers of participants, with the respective groups focusing on issues most important to their constituencies.

*Mediators can resort to sub-working-groups to break up big numbers of participants.*

Hard-liner inclusion can be also a challenge. In some negotiations, international norms (e.g. ‘we don’t negotiate

with terrorists’) or the political concerns of powerful actors do not allow for the inclusion of a key party to the conflict; groups such as Hamas, Al Shabab, and the Taliban have long been excluded from negotiations. In such situations, mediators have tried two approaches. In the Afghanistan negotiations in 2001, mediators



involved more political parties and civil society groups to make the process more legitimate in the absence of the Taliban. By contrast, in the Darfur negotiations in 2009, representatives of militarised Arab groups were deliberately included in the negotiations.

Another challenge is weak or unclear representation. The 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue brought together the Congolese Government in Kinshasa, the armed groups, and the unarmed opposition as well as civil society representatives to ensure broad societal consensus in the negotiations. However, the different groups did not have an equal say in the negotiations and many civil society groups were not genuine representatives of their constituencies.

### **Model Two: Observer status**

Instead of participating as an additional party at the negotiation table, groups could instead have observer status. Observers have used their role in very different ways, from being passive observers to active advisers to the parties or the mediators. This can be particularly effective if a group has a high moral standing in the country and is seen as a guarantor for the agreement. It might also be a means of pleasing certain constituencies.

A key challenge is the selection of observers. Because only a few groups can be granted observer status, selecting appropriately is crucial to making sure that their participation is meaningful. Side-lining is another obvious risk – because of the inherent powerlessness of observer status, there is no guarantee that chief negotiators, mediators or others will listen to any particular observer group. Nevertheless, during the 2003 Accra peace talks the Liberian Bar Association, the Inter-Religious Council for Liberia, and a women's group played a very active role as observers. They did not only help the parties to come to an agreement but also put pressure on the parties in a clever co-operation with groups outside negotiations.

**Model Three: Official consultative forums**

This model consists of formal forums comprising societal or political groups that are an official part of the peace process design. These forums can take place before, parallel to or after official negotiations. Such a forum has to be officially endorsed by all parties and the mediators, as was the case in Guatemala or Afghanistan in 2001. The mandate of such a forum can be specified by the mediator, the conflict parties, or by the groups themselves. In most cases, the consultative forum would follow the same agenda as the official negotiations but it mostly also adds issues to the negotiation agenda. In some cases, participants of official forums can provide back-channel facilitation and monitor the negotiations. It is essential that transfer modalities are agreed, i.e. how recommendations of the forum will be brought to the negotiation table. It is also important to agree whether the forum's recommendations are binding or not.

Conducting an official forum avoids the problems associated with having too many parties at the main negotiation table, while still providing opportunities for groups with a broad set of perspectives to be heard, which lends the process more legitimacy. It can also help facilitate the discussion of difficult issues and provide an alternative channel for negotiations if official negotiations stall.

A disadvantage of this model, however, is its distance from the negotiation table. Further, these forums might be hijacked by groups that seek to dominate the peace process or exclude others. And, if the selection process is not sufficiently representative, the legitimacy of a forum could be damaged and its usefulness reduced. Despite its mandate as an official forum, it can also be ignored, side-lined or dismissed by the principal negotiators, or co-opted by one or more of the main parties. Finally, forum participants could also fail to attain the unity and level of organisation necessary to effectively influence the official negotiations.<sup>4</sup>

### **Model Four: Consultations**

The fourth model of participation, consultations, is less official than the previous model. Here, consultations are not an officially endorsed part of the peace process architecture but can also take place before, parallel to or after official negotiations. Nevertheless, these consultations can enable diverse voices from the population to be heard and can inform wider constituencies about the negotiation process. They not only allow the mediation team to better understand the conflict dynamics and the critical negotiation issues, but also allow mediators to gain insights into people's needs, ideas and visions and to determine which players should be involved in shaping the post-agreement agenda. In comparison with an official consultative forum, these consultations occur at greater distance from the negotiations. The case of the Kenyan post-election violence negotiations in 2008 demonstrates that groups can still have substantial impact on the agreement.<sup>5</sup>

### **Model Five: Inclusive post-agreement mechanisms**

Creating post-agreement mechanisms for the implementation of a peace agreement is crucial in shaping the post-agreement period and, consequently, the future of the country. Most peace agreements contain provisions for including wider representation into implementation mechanisms. Some peace agreements also include provisions for groups to inform the population about the agreement. In Somalia, for example, the 1993 agreement included a provision stipulating that civil society delegations would travel to all parts of the country to educate people about the agreement. Some agreements even provided seats for civil society representatives in national legislatures, as was the case in the Philippines in 1996, Burundi in 2000 and Liberia in 2003.

*Most peace agreements contain provisions for including wider representation into implementation mechanisms.*

Selecting the appropriate representatives to participate in post-agreement institutions is a critical step. In many agreements, the selection is left to the negotiation parties (if it is mentioned at all), but this can create problems by consolidating social divisions. There are exceptions, such as Liberia or the Democratic Republic of Congo, which left the selection to the groups. In Kenya, the 2008 agreement explicitly stated that implementation commissions must be representative (in geographical, ethnic, religious and gender terms). The posts for commission members were publically advertised and subject to further vetting by parliament.

As a rule, general provisions are rarely effective. In cases in which provisions were more specific, groups had already lobbied for the provisions during the negotiations. Additionally, it is equally important to ensure a critical watchdog function for groups outside the official mechanisms. In the Philippines, for example, a local NGO monitored the ceasefire agreement between the parties.

### **Model Six: High-level civil society initiatives**

High-level, so-called 'Track 1.5' initiatives can take place before or in parallel to the official negotiations. These may be outside-supported problem-solving workshops or private facilitation initiatives undertaken either by well-respected civil society leaders from within the country (insider mediators) or by externals. Both seek to strengthen the effectiveness of the negotiations, provide facilitation and, depending on the case, advocate for specific issues to be included in the agreement.

The problem-solving workshops are unofficial and generally not publicly known. They bring together representatives close to the leaders of the conflict parties and offer them a space for discussion without the pressure to reach agreement. The selection of workshop participants is therefore crucial. These workshops can be one-off events or can last as long as several years and are generally organised and facilitated by INGOs or academic in-

stitutions, sometimes in co-operation with local partners. When belligerents refuse to meet, these workshops may be the only common meeting space. Here, groups can pick up where the official negotiators leave off – exploring alternatives, producing position papers, and even drafting agreements that can function as starting points for official negotiations. For mediators it is important to be aware of such initiatives and make effective use of the results of the debates at these workshops.

*When belligerents refuse to meet, [problem-solving] workshops may be the only common meeting space.*

### **Model Seven: Public participation**

Public participation refers to activities that seek to connect large segments of the population with the Track One peace negotiations. Such activities could include public hearings, citizen panels and opinion polls. Public participation serves different objectives, including to:

- improve understanding of the public’s opinions and needs, which in turn informs the negotiation agenda
- create public buy-in and legitimacy for the peace process
- put pressure on the conflict parties and help sustain the peace process
- gather evidence from people about human rights violations or other grievances.

Public participation can take place during negotiations and/or during the implementation of the agreement. For example, years after signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan (CPA) the two parties are still negotiating (sometimes even fighting) about specific unclear or open issues. In this context, public hearings have been organised in a number of states to give people an opportunity to voice their opinions about the CPA, which are then conveyed back to the negotiating parties and mediators. All the major commissions set up to implement the 2008 Kenyan peace deal held public

hearings all over the country to understand people's opinions and grievances. The results informed the recommendations of the commissions.<sup>6</sup>

### **Model Eight: Public decision-making**

Public decision-making processes such as elections and referenda are standard features of democracies. Following an armed conflict, peace agreements and/or new constitutions can be ratified by the electorate. The results are binding. This is a powerful tool to get public buy-in into an elite pact. Peace agreements are frequently negotiated by the moderates within parties. A public decision can then help to protect the agreement from hard-liner constituencies. It also seeks to provide democratic legitimacy to the process, ensuring public support and the sustainability of the agreement. A vote in favour of the agreement gives decision-makers a mandate to continue the process and gives them leverage over hard-line constituencies in their own camps. A vote against the agreement blocks its implementation and usually puts the process on hold. Hence, the decision to put a peace deal to public vote needs careful consideration.

A number of peace agreements have been put to referenda. In Cyprus, for example, Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly accepted the UN-mediated Annan plan, while Greek Cypriots rejected the plan, putting the peace process on hold. In contrast, the referendum over the 1998 Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland went in favour of the agreement. This success can be largely attributed to a citizen 'Yes' campaign in support of the peace deal.<sup>7</sup>

### **Model Nine: Mass action**

Mass action by citizens' groups in the form of street protests or signature campaigns can mobilise significant numbers of people. Most mass action centres on a common goal of national interest such as the end of authoritarian rule or war. Mass action can also take the form of targeted campaigns advocating the inclusion of relevant issues in the peace agreement. It may create a general pro- or anti-peace-agreement atmosphere. In Nepal in

2006, for example, three months of mass demonstrations put pressure on the conflict parties to end the armed conflict and the authoritarian rule, paving the way for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. By way of contrast, during the 2002 peace process in Sri Lanka, demonstrations against peace negotiations and the Norwegian facilitation – often carried out by Buddhist monks – became more frequent and louder than were the demonstrations in support of the peace process. Popular support for the military victory over the LTTE in 2009 demonstrates the power of the pro-war movement, which the facilitators and the international community had underestimated.

It is not easy for mediators or negotiators to influence mass mobilisation. It is therefore crucial for the Track One set-up to constantly monitor developments in this area. Mass action is a very powerful instrument that can either support or challenge a peace process. As the case of Sri Lanka demonstrates, mediators do need to improve their analysis and understanding of the motivation behind mass action, in order to prepare adequate response strategies.

## Endnotes

- 1 Nilsson (2012), assessing 83 peace agreements, found that the inclusion of civil society and political parties substantially increased the sustainability of the agreements understood as no return to violence.
- 2 S/2009/189, 8 April 2009 and A/66/811, 13 September 2012; GA/11104, 22 June 2011; GA/11278, 13 September 2012.
- 3 As in the case of the 2013 Inter-Yemeni Dialogue.
- 4 Nevertheless, the Guatemala Forum in parallel with the two-year UN-mediated peace negotiations from 1994 to 1996 allowed the negotiation agenda to be substantially enriched. Some 80 % of all recommendations made by the Forum were included in the peace agreement.
- 5 In response to the violence at the end of 2007, three networks were founded immediately (on human rights, peace and women's issues). The groups approached the mediation team with non-papers presenting suggestions for how to solve the crisis. At the same time, Kofi Annan as chief mediator had a keen interest in consulting with the groups, as he used their inputs to inform the negotiation agenda and put pressure on the parties. He could demonstrate that proposals made to the parties had broad consensus among various Kenyan constituencies. The groups had formal and informal consultations with Annan's team; they lobbied the international community and presented their proposals in public. As a result, the Kenyan peace agreement did not only end the violence, but brought about a coalition government, a new constitution and a variety of commissions investigating the 2007/08 election violence as well as past historical grievances.
- 6 Similarly, during the peace negotiations in Colombia between 1998 and 2002, the parties involved 25,000 people in public hearings. The hearings focused on debating such critical issues as economic growth, job creation, income distribution and social development, and were broadcast on television. Reports prepared at the end of each public hearing were presented to the government and the chief rebel group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Although the peace talks failed, the public hearings enhanced citizen involvement in the process that followed.
- 7 To this end, the handshake between the leaders of the two conflict parties, David Trimble and John Hume, at a concert by rock band U2 proved particularly effective for the campaign.



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## About the author

Dr Thania Paffenholz works both as an academic in research and teaching, and as a policy adviser in support of peace processes with field experiences in many countries in Africa and Asia. Her main expertise is in mediation and peace process strategies, process design, broadening participation, civil society in peace processes, planning and evaluation of peace processes, and the development-peace nexus.

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Dr Paffenholz has published widely, for both practitioners and scholars, including: *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* (Lynne Rienner, 2000), *Aid for Peace: A Guide to Planning and Evaluation for Conflict Zones* (with Luc Reychler; Nomos, 2007) and *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment* (Lynne Rienner, 2010).

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